What Kind of Europe Does China Need Under Sino

What Kind of Europe Does China Need Under Sino-US Competition?

MaJiahong | School of Global and Area Studies, Renmin University

The international stage in early 2026 has been unsettled by two undercurrents centered on Europe. On one hand, the sovereignty dispute over Greenland continues to simmer. The United States’ aggressive intervention in this icy territory has forced the European Union (EU) to confront "maximalist pressure" from its ally, causing transatlantic fissures to widen further in the public eye. On the other hand, at the recently concluded World Economic Forum in Davos, Western leaders gathered amidst a shared perception of a fracturing global order and the decline of American hegemony. Yet, their aspirations were dampened by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s blunt assessment: “To think that Europe can defend itself without American help is a pipe dream.”

These two events strike at the heart of Europe’s current dilemma, transforming the debate over “whither Europe” from an academic exercise into a focal point of global strategy. While some predict the collapse of the EU, others call for urgent European strategic autonomy. However, penetrating the surface reveals a more profound question: it is not simply whether the EU will disintegrate, but how we should re-perceive Europe as a complex, multi-dimensional political space. Ultimately, we must address a core proposition of immense practical significance: in the context of intensifying structural competition between China and the U.S., what kind of Europe best serves China's medium-to-long-term interests?

The Deep Institutional Dilemma of the EU

The EU has long been a paradigm of global integrated governance, facilitating the high-speed flow of capital, goods, services, and personnel through its single market and common rules. Yet, this institutional success masks a deep paradox: as a community highly dependent on rules and technocratic governance, the EU lacks unified political sovereignty and a stable fiscal redistribution mechanism. Bulgarian scholar Ivan Krastev argued in After Europe that the logic of EU disintegration may not stem from a decisive revolutionary moment or a "Leave" victory in a referendum, but rather from prolonged functional paralysis, the shifting of blame, and a collective loss of confidence.

The “integration logic” of the EU emphasizes regulatory consistency and consensus-based decision-making; however, under intense real-world pressure, this logic can hamper efficiency and erode member state support. Crises regarding refugees, populism, and the conflict in Ukraine have exposed the EU's institutional fragility. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Europe has once again been deeply entangled in great-power rivalry. The post-Cold War institutional architecture of the EU failed to establish a foundation for genuine military integration, leaving it reliant on NATO for security. This “security dependency” is laid bare during moments of international “rupture,” forcing the EU to passively adapt to geodynamic shifts.

This passivity was underscored when Donald Trump—seeking domestic political gains and U.S. strategic interests—attempted to bypass NATO allies to push for the acquisition of Greenland. As Mark Rutte noted at Davos, despite the decline of U.S. hegemony, European self-defense without U.S. aid remains an impossibility. To move beyond criticism of Europe’s perceived “weakness,” we must recognize that Europe is not monolithic; it exists as at least three overlapping entities: an economic community, a defense framework, and a field of socio-political rebellion.

Three Facets of Contemporary European Reality

Europe as an Economic Community: This facet is a model of technocratic governance. While its logic emphasizes technical rules and economic efficiency, the unique characteristics of member states lead to significant divergences in non-market areas such as refugee policy and social welfare. The EU’s success has relied on a “depoliticized” market integration model, which struggles when social contradictions escalate into political conflicts.

Europe as a Geopolitical Space under NATO: Europe remains strategically dependent on U.S. power. While U.S. pressure to increase defense spending has spurred discussions on “strategic autonomy” and initiatives like the “Readiness 2030” plan, achieving this is difficult. Most defense procurement still comes from the U.S., and Europe remains reliant on the American nuclear umbrella. Thus, “strategic autonomy” currently manifests more as "self-financing" within a dependency structure rather than a replacement for NATO.

Europe as a Field of Political Rebellion: The past decade has seen the rise of far-left and far-right forces challenging the EU's governance. While often labeled as “Euroskeptic,” these movements generally oppose the current mode of EU governance rather than the concept of Europe as a political community.

Crucially, both the defense and rebellion facets remain tied to the EU framework. The EU serves not just as a policy executor, but as a "conflict buffer" and a mechanism for political integration.

Internal and External “Euroskepticism”

Contrary to views that the rise of extremist forces in the 2024 European Parliament elections signals the EU’s decline, the system has shown resilience. Right-wing groups like the ECR and ID have been absorbed into the parliamentary process. Figures like Italy’s Giorgia Meloni have moderated their “exit” rhetoric upon taking power, suggesting that the EU continues to maintain a "rebalancing" by internalizing opposition.

However, external forces remain a primary source of Euroskepticism:

The UK (Free-market Euroskepticism): Rooted in the “continental balance of power” tradition, this view favors a “depoliticized” free trade area over a supra-national political union.

The US (Instrumental Euroskepticism): Historically, the U.S. supported economic integration to counter the USSR but remained wary of strategic autonomy. Today, the U.S. wants Europe to pay more for defense but does not desire a strategically independent Europe capable of making autonomous judgments between the U.S. and China.

Russia (Geopolitical Euroskepticism): This view holds that a divided Europe is less capable of acting as a unified strategic actor on the world stage.

A “Consolidated” or “Fragmented” Europe?

Does a “fragmented” Europe serve China's interests? While a “one-policy-per-country” approach may offer short-term tactical advantages in trade negotiations, a highly fragmented Europe may be detrimental to China in the long term. Without a unified institutional buffer, European nations are more easily integrated into U.S.-led anti-China strategies. Furthermore, fragmentation often leads to domestic political polarization, which can cause foreign policy—including policy toward China—to become more radically ideological.

In this sense, an institutionalized, predictable EU with a degree of strategic autonomy could serve as a “third pole” between China and the U.S.. China does not necessarily need a “pro-China” Europe, but rather a Europe that handles disputes through rules and negotiations rather than bloc mobilization. Supporting European integration and strategic autonomy prevents Europe from being easily subsumed by the U.S.. While bilateral strategies remain important, maintaining the overall stability of European integration aligns with China’s long-term interests.